Outlier! The front seven has been the pride of the Carolina Panthers for the past two seasons. Highlighting the greatest concentration of talent and experience on the team, the front seven defenders are the club's rock.
We've seen the offensive line overmatched, the run game sputter, a secondary razed. But since the acquisition of Star Lotulelei, Kawann Short, and Colin Cole, never has the front seven been so belittled. Without its bastion, the team capsized.
Here's a look at the rushing yards allowed over the last twenty games (playoffs included).
In a normal data set, an outlier is greater than three standard deviations from the mean. Using a normal calculator, the probability that the Panthers defense surrender an amount greater than or equal to 264-yards is .00046. Seriously. For those who are curious: Over the past twenty games, the median amount of yardage allowed by the Panthers run defense is 77, with an interquartile range of 49.
Only when you travel back to the 2011 season will you find an occasion where the Panthers allowed more total yards to an opponent; 617-yards in New Orleans (Week 17) and 495-yards in Detroit (Week 11).
Last Sunday's drumming is a fantastic reminder on the perils of using past performance to predict the future. "That's why they play the games."
Invariably the numbers are skewed towards 11 personnel. But it didn't start out that way. Offensive Coordinator Mike Shula shied away from 11 personnel early: Carolina's first six plays would come from 12, 21, and 22 personnel. This trend also applied to first down play selection. The first half-dozen first down plays would come from two wide receiver sets.
Once again the read option was a non-entity. One rush for three-yards. For years now, read option plays have driven the Carolina run game. Bearish on Newton's health, the staff has shelved the option game, correlating with suboptimal results running the ball (just like last year).
The standard operating procedure in a blowout loss, the Panthers leaned on 11 personnel in second half. Every snap in the fourth quarter was a passing play from a 3-WR set. Thus far Coach Shula has done a fine job establishing balance within 11 personnel, but as the deficit widened, balance was of diminishing concern. With attrition experienced in the backfield, don't expect much from 21 personnel in the near future.
12 personnel was involved to a greater degree last week, but it wasn't to Ed Dickson's benefit. As we've seen in prior weeks, Richie Brockel pilfered a healthy amount of snaps in the Ben Hartsock role.
In an alternate universe, I wonder what it would look like if Carolina played the entire game in 22 or 23 personnel.
First down play calling was relatively balanced, and less predictable than in weeks prior. Until the second half that is. Third down run-pass balance was non existent; the Panthers threw from 11 personnel on every third down but one.
The defensive fronts and coverages followed an inverse trajectory.
Spreading the field in first half, then running the clock out in the fourth quarter. Whereas in the first half, Pittsburgh primarily ran against the Panthers nickel package, the second half comprised solely of runs against the base 43.
By and large, man coverage was reserved for the red zone. The few occasions where Carolina did play man in the open field were almost uniformly disastrous. Two completions of over 30-yards and a defensive pass interference penalty of 19-yards.
Inside zone plays shredded the Carolina front seven. A prime example of which being Leveon Bell's 81-yard carry. Bell has great feet; excellent stride length behind the line of scrimmage, which allowed him to manipulate the Panthers linebackers.
Here's the pre-snap alignment. There's no surprise in Pittsburgh's play call, DB's Cason and Harper are already in proximity to the line of scrimmage.
At the snap both of Carolina's young defensive tackles are doubled, Lotulelei the 3-tech, Short the 1-tech. The left guard is able to get into Short's body. It is imperative that the defensive linemen hold their blocks long enough for the linebackers to move on the running back.
By nature of the play, Will LB Thomas Davis is in conflict, responsible for two gaps. Bell sells the veteran outside, forcing him to hesitate just long enough. Meanwhile Short is walled off and moved out of his gap; Lotulelei is likewise thrashed.
Bell explodes, exchanging his choppy steps for a longer gait in the open field.
But it's not as if Carolina had no counter for Pittsburgh's success with inside zone plays. In order to compensate for the extra gap on the weakside, DC Sean McDermott dropped a safety into the box, as you'll note in the first picture. However, in this instance, Pittsburgh shifts their TE in motion, changing the weakside designation, and counteracting Carolina's adjustment.
The offensive line took a lot of heat for their performance against a seemingly lackluster Steeler pass rush. However QB Cam Newton was doing them no favors. Despite his box score, the Panthers QB had a shaky game. Newton was prone to holding onto the football too long, or acting oblivious to pressure.
An example of the latter, here's a second down play from the third quarter.
The Steelers are lined up in a radar front, disguising which defenders will rush the passer; the alignment itself didn't trick the Panthers linemen except for a few notable exceptions.
The Steelers rush three. As Newton completes his drop, the pocket is constricting.
Newton stands statuesque. With his eyes downfield, it's as if Newton doesn't sense the pressure. There's real estate to climb to pocket and deliver a pass, but Newton doesn't move off his spot.
With impending contact, Newton decides to throw to Avant on the shallow cross. The signal caller has no room to step into his throw, or time to adjust his shoulders.
Newton is hit as he throws; the pass hits the grass three-yards before it reaches the intended target.
That was adequate protection, but Newton's poor pocket presence results in a hit.
This next play has more dire consequences.
Similar front, this play comes on a passing down for Carolina.
Byron Bell played a solid game in pass protection, sans two or three blocks, this being one. Here Bell, anticipating the Jarvis Jones speed rush, turns his shoulders too soon. The biggest error, one common for Bell, occurs at the point of contact. The OT catches the comparatively diminutive Jones instead of delivering a punch.
Though Newton has a clean pocket as he completes his drop.
Jones keeps churning his legs, and with his leverage is able to claw his way to the quarterback. Again Newton doesn't move after completing his drop. Instead of responding to pressure, the QB ignores it. Another three man rush, Newton could earn himself two more unmolested seconds in the pocket if he only moves up. One or two hitch steps is all.
The passer stays still, cocks his arm, and is stripped by Jones. Pittsburgh would stretch the score to 16-3 on the ensuing possession.
This isn't a case of Newton being worried about his ankle. It is a case of poor pocket management.
Roughly as troublesome is how Newton plays with time on his side.
This play comes on 3rd & 15 in the fourth quarter, down two scores. Pittsburgh shows man coverage with two high safeties.
Everybody's favorite rookie, Kelvin Benjamin is running a 9-route from the slot.
As the QB completes his drop, there is no hint of pressure. Newton's read is the weakside safety who stays deep, connoting Man-2 under coverage. The X WR, splitting the safeties, this ball needs to go to Benjamin.
Benjamin has two steps on his man. Newton remains still as he scans the field.
More eminent minds than my own say you can read a quarterback's mind by watching his feet. After an extraordinarily long time in the pocket, Newton panics. The QB chops his feet anxiously, and looks for his checkdown, Mike Tolbert, even with no impending pressure.
On 3rd & 15, under no pressure, Newton looks for the checkdown. Delivering the pass on the run.
As for his overall development, the fourth-year passer also had trouble seeing the field.
This play comes in the second quarter.
In 11 personnel, Carolina motions RB Jonathan Stewart out wide, which prompts the sole CB on that side of the field to follow him. This leaves WR Philly Brown in single coverage against pass rusher Jarvis Jones. Brown is running a 9-route.
Pittsburgh doesn't disguise their coverage, showing man across the board.
The quarterback shows no understanding of the defensive adjustment.
Newton reads man coverage, takes the snap, and locks in on his first read, TE Greg Olsen running a curl. With no hesitation, Newton rifles a pass to Olsen's ankles.
Jones doesn't even turn to run with Brown. If Newton puts the ball anywhere in this vicinity, only a foot race with the deep safety stands between the UDFA and the end zone.
Olsen is able to make the diving catch for a gain of six-yards.
You must punish an opponent for their mistakes. Newton sends Stewart in motion because that's what he's told to do. The QB doesn't pause to think how the defense will react. Instead Newton predetermines his throw based on the coverage.
In a familiar refrain, if the Panthers are to win today, Newton must be more decisive, more aware in the pocket. If he isn't, then fans will blame his offensive line and general manager.